Turkey
and the Erdogan-Gulen puzzle
Elena
Spilioti for TA YP OPSIN – CONSIDER THESE podcast : Mr. Guzeldere, in Turkey
this time there's concrete accusation of corruption, but until we find out the
entire truth it will take time. Meanwhile
there's a lot of speculation on what will happen after Erdogan, if Gulen and Erdogan -as they say- are two
faces of the same coin ?
Gulen talks about democratic capitalism,
education, science, and a world where Muslims are capable of working like
Westerners but still preserving their own values. What do you think his
supporters believe? He has powerful supporters. Among them there are business
men and intellectuals. Do they think, to the extent that you may know, that his
ideas might become applicable as a way of governance?
EKREM
EDDY GUZELDERE: First of all, I would
like to say something about the numbers to get it a little bit into
perspective. Turkey
has currently a population of about 75, 76 million. The Gulen movement is
estimated at roughly five million. Even if the Gulen movement were to
form a political party and almost all would vote for it, it is not clear
whether this party would even get more than 10% to be presented in parliament
and if so, would only be a smaller coalition partner.
What concerns their
concrete ideas for politics in Turkey is very difficult to say, because there
we do not know much in concrete. There is a network of schools. It is known
that the graduates from these schools are advised especially to apply to
certain professions. What
they are supposed to do afterwards in these positions, be it in the judiciary
or in the police, is not very clear.
Even in the current confrontation
between the Gulen movement and the AKP and especially the person of the Prime
Minister, it is not clear what they would do differently in concrete politics.
It is not clear either who exactly belongs to the Gulen movement or who is just
a sympathizer, or who has maybe very little to do but is put into the same
basket. It's
not very transparent and therefore it is difficult to say who actually is really
part of that movement, who is a sympathizer and who does not have anything to
do with it.
E.S.: Is it true, however, that the Turks are looking for
a new identity during the last, I would say, ten years?
E.G.: What has happened in Turkey,
especially after Turkey became an EU candidate in 1999 and then with the AKP
who has been in power since 2002, is that there are many reforms that have
completely changed the political, social, and economic life of Turkey. A very
closed country up until the 1980s opened up first the economy and then
politics. Be it inside the country with political reforms and be it also the
outlook to its neighborhood and international relations.
To a great extent this
was a normalization of affairs in- and outside Turkey. But it was not as
harmonic as it seemed, there are more rifts within the AKP and among the people
who voted for the AKP. There
were common interests of many different groups that supported the AKP for the
first five, six, seven years of their government.
There was a little bit the
perception within Turkey and especially abroad that there is one Islamic
movement and they more or less all want the same and they follow the same ideas
and the same persons. However, there are many different groups within that
Islamic movement and of course outside the Islamic movement in support of the
AKP. Within the past two to three years, these differences have become clearer.
The AKP has become more authoritarian and there is more opposition from several
groups, be it the Gulen movement or from outside the Islamic movement: the
liberals who have almost completely abandoned the AKP and other smaller groups
that also supported the AKP. There is a growing authoritarianism visible during
the past two, three years and the AKP, which won three consecutive elections
now thinks that it can and should govern and rule alone and does not need any
more alliances and partners. This
is a process now of confronting and fighting against these former allies and
partners.
E.S: [Would you elaborate on] The
fact that there's no alliance or collaboration with other parties even in the
case where there's this scenario of having presidential democracy?
E.G: Yes. This was the plan of the Prime Minister to
change the constitution, make it more Presidential, and then be elected
President in 2014 where Presidential elections will be held in August. For
the first time the President will then be elected by popular vote. Before, the President was only
elected inside parliament. This has not worked out the way Erdogan wanted it,
because these constitutional changes were not made.
Now, there will be
elections in 2014 of the President by public vote but the President is still,
by and large, a representative one not very different from the President in
Germany and Austria and won't have far reaching powers as Erdogan wished. At
least for the time being, and since there will be national elections in 2015, most
likely until 2015, there won't be a major change of the constitution and the
constitution won't become any more Presidential.
E.S: How will the current situation
in Turkey affect the elections ? They
are just a few months away.
E.G: The first elections that will
be held in a row of three elections are the regional elections. They are scheduled
for 30 March 2014 and regional elections in Turkey are held on one day
nationwide for all the provinces and all the municipalities. The AKP in the
last national elections in 2011 almost won fifty percent. If elections were
next week then, we would see an effect of the corruption scandal and of the demissions
of ministers and the change of ten ministers in the cabinet.
However, there are still almost three months and a lot can
happen. The AKP is the most professional party organization in Turkey. It
controls a large part of the media, especially TV, which is the most important
one, but also numerous newspapers. They represent the view of the government
and of the Prime Minister. It is
still possible that for the regional elections, if the scandal does not become
bigger and does not involve people closer to Erdogan or his family and himself,
that there will only be a minor change in the votes for the AKP.
Maybe a drop of three to five percent, which
means that they will still be by far the biggest party and still win the most
important cities, being Istanbul and Ankara. However, with
slight decrease in votes some of the cities that the AKP, before that scandal
became known, sought to win this time won't be possible.
So far there's not a huge change in
the voter preferences and one of the problem for this is also that the
population does not see the opposition as a real alternative to the governing
party. Until this does not change the only effect that we can
directly see from a loss of vote of the AKP is that the group of non-voters or
people that are undecided will increase.
E.S: Given the difference between the two poles of
political life in Turkey nowadays, we can say that Erdogan is a person but
Gulen is a movement. If at a certain Erdogan as a person is out of the picture
for whatever reason, let's say he decides to resign, let's say that he's
physically not able to perform his duties, what do you feel would be Turkey
after Erdogan?
E.G: Yes this is, of course, one of the tricky questions
because now Erdogan is the person that holds the different wings of the AKP
together. Without Erdogan probably the party will split into its fractions and
won't be as powerful as it is now. He is the charismatic leader that appeals to
many in the population. That scenario is, for the time being, not very likely. If,
for health reasons or other reasons, he would resign let's say next year or in
two years, then I would predict that the party would divide in at least two
parties with one more progressive reformist wing and one more conservative closer
to the political movement where the party has its roots, which is called the National
View whose founder was Necmettin Erbakan. This new, more progressive reformist
party, could then again be the driving force for change.
E.S: Do you think that people in Turkey believe in
Turkey becoming a member of the European Union or do they think that Turkey not
being a member of the European Union would be more powerful regarding its role
in the Middle East?
E.G: The population now is a lot
more skeptic and are more negative towards the EU than ten or five years ago. As
we can see from surveys, the support for EU membership dropped from around 75%
to now only 35%. The reasons for this are that during the past years there was
not much progress in the accession negotiations and issues like the blocking of
chapters (by Cyprus and France) or that Turks can't travel visa free to EU
countries had a very negative impact on the population.
Also, of course, the discourse
within Turkey that more and more politicians talk about alternatives or say
that the EU needs us more than Turkey needs the EU has its effect.
However, this can also
change quickly again, for example, a solution on Cyprus that would immediately
lead toward the de-blocking of eight chapters or a change of attitude of the
French government would have immediately a positive effect also in Turkey. Of course, there is a debate on
alternatives and looking East and Erdogan asking Putin to become a member of
the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation. However, I think
that through the experiences of the past two years with the neighboring
countries and the Arab Spring, many in Turkey saw that this is not a real
alternative and that the best anchor for stability and democratization are
closer relations with the EU. And there is some little development, one new
chapter was opened only some weeks ago after three years of not opening any
chapter. And there has been the start of the visa liberalization process recently.
I think there's still,
even if it looks difficult in this now very tense situation, there's still room
for improvement in 2014 on the Turkey EU relations. Of course, Turkey should
have good relations with its neighbors and also good contacts to the Middle
East but this should not be seen as an alternative to EU membership.
E.S: I suppose there's also the political solution
within the European Union to open or to close specific chapters, even if these
initiatives are not supported a hundred percent by evidence.
E.G: Yes, of course. Politicians
can say that they are working even on blocked chapters and that progress is
happening and that the bureaucracy is working and the technical process is
continuing. To have something positive to sell, you need to open the one or the
other chapter at least once a year.
This has not happened for three
years. Even if there was now the opening of one chapter and still
two or three chapters could be opened, this means that after these are opened, there's
not much more to negotiate. That is why there should be a change of attitude on
the side of France deblocking the chapters blocked by Sarkozy and there should be,
not only because of Turkey, but because of the population on Cyprus, there
should be a solution on Cyprus, which would lead also to the deblocking of
eight chapters, but more importantly would have a great psychological effect on
Turkey-EU relations. Ethnic Turks would be MEPs, Turkish would become an
official EU language etc.
E.S.: Sure, because we have to remember that for the
accession of a new member all the negotiations are between the commission and
the already-members of the European Union.
E.G: Of course.
E.S: Mr. Guzeldere, thank you very much for your time.
We hope to have you back on our podcast. We are neighbors and things that
happen in Turkey do directly or indirectly affect the situation in Greece to a
certain extent too.
E.K: I thank you. Efharisto poly! ( translated: Thank
you! In Greek)
