In the case of Egypt, the question maybe shouldn’t be “coup”
or “no coup” but “invited “ or not “invited” coup. That might take care of a
lot of technicalities since, after all, the term is not included in the U.S.
law which bars "any assistance to the government of any country whose duly
elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'etat or decree."
As Huntington has insisted, “ the most important causes
of military intervention are not
military but political and reflect [….] the political and institutional
structure of the society”. Or, in other
words, wherever there is a void, there is an opportunity/ chance / excuse for
intervention. Yet, not all military regimes are everywhere the same: some
champion the poor while others have supported wealthy corporate and landowning
interests. The probability of military involvement depending, among others, on class
origins, educational levels, ideological orientations and internal organization
of the officer corps, it is also a fact that, especially in the developing
countries, the armed forces offer great organizational coherence and clarity of
purpose: this is their strength but also their failure to appreciate the
functional aspects of the game of politics. Civilian political institutions on
the other hand do not regard things in terms of black and white: this is one of
their virtues and vulnerabilities.
In cases of external enemy, civilian institutions have
been able to exercise control over the military but when the military is
trained to fight for internal security, it is invariably taught on domestic political
and economic issues: involvement in domestic politics is only a step away: to
restore and maintain order and stability, to punish corruption, to promote
specific policies and economic development – successful results not necessarily
guaranteed, tensions almost sure. And, in the case of Egypt, to become the
vehicle for the expression of the majority of the population which decided to
oust Mursi.
If / When a legitimate government emerges in Egypt and
the country is not run by decrees any more, the military may go back to the
barracks: “mission accomplished”, this was a “caretaker” coup (?), foreign aid
(especially the US one) continues to
come in therefore the military remains financially strong as does its image (
no failed governance tests risk due to prolonged stay) : but will the national
political culture of Egypt develop a strong belief in the unique legitimacy of
the procedures for the transfer of power (such as elections) and in the
capability of sovereign individuals and institutions to legitimately hold that
power? And how strong can civil society (meaning
the associations, unions etc that can act independently of the government) become
if the Muslim Brotherhood does not develop a moderate leadership?
Unless the Egyptian civil society heads in this
direction, the state of the economy and the fractioned opposition may create
the demand for the next leader to step down too – but what if an interim ( or not
) situation supported by the military is still there? Just before Mursi, the
army offered to help govern a country in disarray for three months and it stayed
on for seventeen. Will agreements with the international community ( economic and
political) be legitimate and binding for
the next government or will this have to wait? If so, what will happen in the
country in the meantime with people waiting in line due to gas shortage and the
huge percentage of the population - the young ones- is un- or underemployed? And most of all, how
will the clash of secular versus religious values be handled? The interim
president already talked about a new ‘ethos” – implementation details to be seen
to while the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood is in jail, maybe just for now, and
TV stations have been raided.
If the young democracy of Egypt is in a process of “political
learning” – and for that matter, the “political Islam” is currently learning
too: a failure does not necessarily mean
the end -, civilian leaders may understand how to avoid future military interventions.
Until then,
countries may have or not have a coup, depending on what the domestic and foreign
policy of other international players decide to call it.-Elena Spilioti
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