Interview with political
analyst and journalist Ekrem Eddy Guzeldere on the recent presidential elections
in Turkey ( August 11 2014) TRANSCRIPT)
Elena Spilioti: Mr. Guzeldere we welcome you back to Ta Yp
Opsin, to Consider These podcast, Thank
you for your availability.
Ekrem Eddy Guzeldere: Thanks for having me back.
ES: So,
it has happened: everybody was expecting
that Erdogan would triumph in these elections- however there are still certain
questions. The percentage so far is close to 52% and his opponents claim that
this is not such an impressive difference. They accuse Erdogan that he had
exerted control over the media. Of course, he was controlling most sectors of
public life either through social politics or through the economy, which seems
to his strong card. Also we see that all the coastal cities as well as those in
eastern Thrace voted for the opposition while cities in Central Anatolia gave
the newly elected president a large majority. Keeping also in mind that Selahattin
Demirtas who was supported by the pro-Kurdish party, the BDP, has increased his ratings and looks to have
appeal to young voters. How strong is Erdogan at this point?
EG: Of course, he won the
elections in the first round and he can claim success, but as you rightly said
most expected a higher result of 55 or even 57 to 59%. He won and he will be
the president by the end of all of this, but with less votes than he expected.
The result in general is not a huge surprise. The victory of the opposition
candidate in Thrace and the Riviera coast is also more or less along the lines
of which parties won in the municipal elections in March. CHP and MHP are very
strong at the Coast and in Thrace and the Kurdish party BDP in the major cities
in most of the South Eastern provinces made it also logical that they might as
well vote favorite there.
Now what does this mean for the upcoming weeks
and months? That there are several question marks. One is who will succeed
Prime Minister Erdogan as Prime Minister and as the party chairman? This person
will then also be the top candidate for the upcoming elections, which will be
probably in June 2015. With this result of 52% and also keeping in mind the
result at the municipal elections with about 43%, it is very unlikely that the
AKP will get a three-fifths majority in the next parliament so that it can
change the constitution and make it a more presidential system. The overall
result is that yes, Erdogan won and will be the president for five years, but
he will most likely not be able to change the constitution and make it more
presidential. He will be a president more along the lines as was Abdullah Gul
and his predecessors.
ES: Is there such a thing as a
Muslim democrat in the way that Erdogan seems to be promoting as an idea?
EG: As an idea, of course, but
whether the AKP stuck to this idea that it promoted itself when the party was
founded in 2001 and in the first election, that is a question mark. There are
doubts that the AKP is still as much committed to modern democratic standards, democratization
and human rights as it was before. In theory, of course, this is something
possible and it’s something desirable for Turkey and for neighboring countries.
ES: What about situation with
Gulen now that Erdogan has relatively triumphed?
EG: Absolutely, you are right
that this ongoing battle since December of last year has clearly the upper hand
with the AKP. In the year before the election there were again arrests of
police officers some of them high ranking who were supposed to be close or
members of the Gulen movement. This election result again will be interpreted
by Erdogan and the AKP that they do not need Gulen, that his movement is not as
strong as it was thought and he can’t continue cracking down on them be it in
the economy, be it in the judiciary, in the police and in civil society.
The government already decided to close down all the afternoon
schools, the most important institutes of the Gulen movement to recruit new
members and to be influential in society. They will interpret this as a green
light to continue that struggle and to if not eliminate completely, but to
weaken significantly the Gulen movement.
ES: I suppose that Gulen is not
his only problem, because as you explained before according to the local
political balance a huge part or at least an important part of the country has
voted overwhelmingly for the opposition. What do you think were the reasons for
that? Were they only economic? We know that Anatolia does include quite a few
rich businessmen, but on the other hand they are conservative. Where do you
attribute this difference in the electoral result percentages?
EG: In the past years Turkey has
become ever more polarized and ideology still is an important factor
determining election outcomes for at least more than a third of the voters.
There are core voters of the CHP and the MHP and they live mainly in Thrace and
the Aegean at the coastline and maybe in the province of Tuncelli. There are
ideological core voters of the Kurdish party in the southeastern provinces,
which are roughly 13. There is a difference between the coastline, central
Anatolia and the southeast, this is not a surprise. Even as Erdogan dominates
the media and is the most present
( ???? )candidate (in the media is what I meant) and the AKP has more
money and resources and got more than 10 times of donations than the other two
candidates there is a limit to whom they can have access. These ideological
voters of the other parties seem to be relatively stable after AKP got from 35
to 50%. There seems to be the limit to
attract even more voters and this was confirmed again with this election.
ES: Talking about stability,
let’s talk briefly on the international role that Turkey had the ambition to
play in the region. Just a couple of years ago and maybe even more recently
Erdogan made a few moves that would position him as a national hero through the
interactions with Israel and also by deciding to support Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt. However, Muslim Brotherhood did not end well and with Israel it seems
that on the paper he is against, but on the other side we see that trade( with
Israel) is better than ever. Is that a
question of diplomatic skills, is it a question of credibility and morality, or
is it the question of judgment that would finally return Turkey to assume a
much stronger role in the region?
EG: It’s difficult to imagine this
currently because all what you’ve mentioned also indicates a failure of policy
approach that try to be more influential in the region, make Turkey a regional
power, maybe even a model for the Arab and Muslim worlds. There was much talk
about Turkey’s soft power and the possibility to influence other countries and
this has not materialized. Currently Turkey does not have an ambassador in
Egypt, in Israel and in Syria. It has very bad relations to the central
government in Iraq, it has strained relations with Iran and more or less the
only ally currently is Hamas, which is largely isolated even in the Arab world.
Turkey now is far away from becoming an influential regional power,
but is a lot more isolated than three or four years ago. With Israel it looked
as if there was again rapprochement this
year with the initiative of the US to bring the two together. Trade and
economic relations are doing well also because Syria is lost as a market. Since
the Gaza attacks and the Hamas rockets Turkey sided again strongly with Hamas
and condemning Israel so that in the coming weeks and months there will not be
any kind of rapprochement possible between the two. Then still that will be
difficult on the political level and the economic situation and the relation
seems to be going well.
ES: You are continuously exposed
to situations both in Germany (and Europe in genera)l and in Turkey. What is
your feeling about the relation between Turkey and the European Union?
Currently Turkey benefits from the Russian embargo because it does have all the
plusses and none of the minuses of being a regular member of the European
Union. Do you think or do you hear that maybe this new president would continue
to pursue the European membership or delay it on his own time?
EG: Currently already there is
not much going on in the EU negotiations. According to the constitution the
President in Turkey is mainly representative and does not dominate daily
politics. This at least there will be a new constitution this is also the case
for Erdogan, so I don’t see that there will be a major change in the EU relations
because Erdogan is now president. He was prime minister and he had his EU ministers
and more or less the same personnel with the same program will continue in the
coming months. I don’t see that this will worsen in the next months, but I
don’t see any signs that there will be any improvement in this relation.
ES: It is that without that role
that there may be an unofficial collaboration between Gul and Erdogan in the
case that Gul wants to return to the party, in which case Erdogan’s personality
and ideology would obviously influence the situation. However, how do you think
that the relation with the rest of the West will develop? He has mentioned Ataturk
quite a few times, although we understand that they may be completely opposite
as far as values were concerned. Do you think that the West is ready to deal
with a country that has such a confused identity?
EG: Yeah, that’s correct. It’s confusing
for the Turks and for the neighbors and for the West how Turkey developed in
the past years, but it’s not that I expect many changes because of the shift
from Erdogan from prime ministry to the presidency. For the government still,
Europe is quite important also because of the turmoil in the neighborhood and
these worsening relations with Arab countries and Turkey's standing in the
Muslim world.
For Europe as it sees all this turmoil, it is also in Europe’s
interest to have a democratic Turkey that is linked strongly to the EU, than to
have one that is less credible, closer
to Russia, closer to Arab countries where democratic standards and values are a
lot less important. I think both sides still have a huge interest to at least
continue with the negotiations, which in any case will last at least for
another five, six or even ten years and then decide whether Turkey should become
a full member or opt for another constellation.
ES: For now it seems that Turkey
has the assurance of Rasmussen that NATO will intervene in case the ISIS
continues proceeding and maybe will also enter the Turkish territory at a
certain point. There are quite a few problems that we are supposed to follow
because they have regional implications. Are we to understand that 52% does not
mean a carte blanche for Erdogan as far as the people of Turkey are considered?
EG: No, because it is not the
huge majority that Erdogan and the AKP expected. It’s important also to
remember that voter turnout this time was extremely low for Turkey standards
with only 74%. In the municipal elections, still 89% voted, there is the
obligation by law to vote in Turkey. That’s why the turnout has always been
since 1983 around 90%. This time the elections were in the major holiday season
with many people not in the cities or villages where they are registered. With
this low voter turnout this also means that Erdogan got also a lot less than
50%.
ES: Mr.Guzeldere, we thank you
one more time for sharing your ideas about this historic election.
EG: I thank you as always.
