Wednesday, August 27, 2014

TRANSCRIPT of the Aug 11 2014 interview with political analyst Ekrem Eddy Guzeldere on the recent presidential elections in Turkey

Interview with political analyst and journalist Ekrem Eddy Guzeldere on the recent presidential elections in Turkey ( August 11 2014) TRANSCRIPT)
Elena Spilioti:  Mr. Guzeldere we welcome you back to Ta Yp Opsin, to Consider These podcast,  Thank you for your availability.
Ekrem Eddy Guzeldere:          Thanks for having me back.

ES:                  So, it has happened:  everybody was expecting that Erdogan would triumph in these elections- however there are still certain questions. The percentage so far is close to 52% and his opponents claim that this is not such an impressive difference. They accuse Erdogan that he had exerted control over the media. Of course, he was controlling most sectors of public life either through social politics or through the economy, which seems to his strong card. Also we see that all the coastal cities as well as those in eastern Thrace voted for the opposition while cities in Central Anatolia gave the newly elected president a large majority. Keeping also in mind that Selahattin Demirtas who was supported by the pro-Kurdish party, the BDP, has  increased his ratings and looks to have appeal to young voters. How strong is Erdogan at this point?

 

EG:                   Of course, he won the elections in the first round and he can claim success, but as you rightly said most expected a higher result of 55 or even 57 to 59%. He won and he will be the president by the end of all of this, but with less votes than he expected. The result in general is not a huge surprise. The victory of the opposition candidate in Thrace and the Riviera coast is also more or less along the lines of which parties won in the municipal elections in March. CHP and MHP are very strong at the Coast and in Thrace and the Kurdish party BDP in the major cities in most of the South Eastern provinces made it also logical that they might as well vote favorite there.
                        Now what does this mean for the upcoming weeks and months? That there are several question marks. One is who will succeed Prime Minister Erdogan as Prime Minister and as the party chairman? This person will then also be the top candidate for the upcoming elections, which will be probably in June 2015. With this result of 52% and also keeping in mind the result at the municipal elections with about 43%, it is very unlikely that the AKP will get a three-fifths majority in the next parliament so that it can change the constitution and make it a more presidential system. The overall result is that yes, Erdogan won and will be the president for five years, but he will most likely not be able to change the constitution and make it more presidential. He will be a president more along the lines as was Abdullah Gul and his predecessors.
ES:                   Is there such a thing as a Muslim democrat in the way that Erdogan seems to be promoting as an idea?
EG:                   As an idea, of course, but whether the AKP stuck to this idea that it promoted itself when the party was founded in 2001 and in the first election, that is a question mark. There are doubts that the AKP is still as much committed to modern democratic standards, democratization and human rights as it was before. In theory, of course, this is something possible and it’s something desirable for Turkey and for neighboring countries.
ES:                   What about situation with Gulen now that Erdogan has relatively triumphed?
EG:                   Absolutely, you are right that this ongoing battle since December of last year has clearly the upper hand with the AKP. In the year before the election there were again arrests of police officers some of them high ranking who were supposed to be close or members of the Gulen movement. This election result again will be interpreted by Erdogan and the AKP that they do not need Gulen, that his movement is not as strong as it was thought and he can’t continue cracking down on them be it in the economy, be it in the judiciary, in the police and in civil society.
The government already decided to close down all the afternoon schools, the most important institutes of the Gulen movement to recruit new members and to be influential in society. They will interpret this as a green light to continue that struggle and to if not eliminate completely, but to weaken significantly the Gulen movement.
ES:                   I suppose that Gulen is not his only problem, because as you explained before according to the local political balance a huge part or at least an important part of the country has voted overwhelmingly for the opposition. What do you think were the reasons for that? Were they only economic? We know that Anatolia does include quite a few rich businessmen, but on the other hand they are conservative. Where do you attribute this difference in the electoral result percentages?
EG:                   In the past years Turkey has become ever more polarized and ideology still is an important factor determining election outcomes for at least more than a third of the voters. There are core voters of the CHP and the MHP and they live mainly in Thrace and the Aegean at the coastline and maybe in the province of Tuncelli. There are ideological core voters of the Kurdish party in the southeastern provinces, which are roughly 13. There is a difference between the coastline, central Anatolia and the southeast, this is not a surprise. Even as Erdogan dominates the media and is the most present ( ???? )candidate (in the media is what I meant) and the AKP has more money and resources and got more than 10 times of donations than the other two candidates there is a limit to whom they can have access. These ideological voters of the other parties seem to be relatively stable after AKP got from 35 to 50%.  There seems to be the limit to attract even more voters and this was confirmed again with this election.
ES:                   Talking about stability, let’s talk briefly on the international role that Turkey had the ambition to play in the region. Just a couple of years ago and maybe even more recently Erdogan made a few moves that would position him as a national hero through the interactions with Israel and also by deciding to support Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. However, Muslim Brotherhood did not end well and with Israel it seems that on the paper he is against, but on the other side we see that trade( with Israel)  is better than ever. Is that a question of diplomatic skills, is it a question of credibility and morality, or is it the question of judgment that would finally return Turkey to assume a much stronger role in the region?
EG:                   It’s difficult to imagine this currently because all what you’ve mentioned also indicates a failure of policy approach that try to be more influential in the region, make Turkey a regional power, maybe even a model for the Arab and Muslim worlds. There was much talk about Turkey’s soft power and the possibility to influence other countries and this has not materialized. Currently Turkey does not have an ambassador in Egypt, in Israel and in Syria. It has very bad relations to the central government in Iraq, it has strained relations with Iran and more or less the only ally currently is Hamas, which is largely isolated even in the Arab world.
Turkey now is far away from becoming an influential regional power, but is a lot more isolated than three or four years ago. With Israel it looked as if there was again rapprochement  this year with the initiative of the US to bring the two together. Trade and economic relations are doing well also because Syria is lost as a market. Since the Gaza attacks and the Hamas rockets Turkey sided again strongly with Hamas and condemning Israel so that in the coming weeks and months there will not be any kind of rapprochement possible between the two. Then still that will be difficult on the political level and the economic situation and the relation seems to be going well.
ES:                   You are continuously exposed to situations both in Germany (and Europe in genera)l and in Turkey. What is your feeling about the relation between Turkey and the European Union? Currently Turkey benefits from the Russian embargo because it does have all the plusses and none of the minuses of being a regular member of the European Union. Do you think or do you hear that maybe this new president would continue to pursue the European membership or delay it on his own time?
EG:                   Currently already there is not much going on in the EU negotiations. According to the constitution the President in Turkey is mainly representative and does not dominate daily politics. This at least there will be a new constitution this is also the case for Erdogan, so I don’t see that there will be a major change in the EU relations because Erdogan is now president. He was prime minister and he had his EU ministers and more or less the same personnel with the same program will continue in the coming months. I don’t see that this will worsen in the next months, but I don’t see any signs that there will be any improvement in this relation.
ES:                   It is that without that role that there may be an unofficial collaboration between Gul and Erdogan in the case that Gul wants to return to the party, in which case Erdogan’s personality and ideology would obviously influence the situation. However, how do you think that the relation with the rest of the West will develop? He has mentioned Ataturk quite a few times, although we understand that they may be completely opposite as far as values were concerned. Do you think that the West is ready to deal with a country that has such a confused identity?
EG:                   Yeah, that’s correct. It’s confusing for the Turks and for the neighbors and for the West how Turkey developed in the past years, but it’s not that I expect many changes because of the shift from Erdogan from prime ministry to the presidency. For the government still, Europe is quite important also because of the turmoil in the neighborhood and these worsening relations with Arab countries and Turkey's standing in the Muslim world.
For Europe as it sees all this turmoil, it is also in Europe’s interest to have a democratic Turkey that is linked strongly to the EU, than to have  one that is less credible, closer to Russia, closer to Arab countries where democratic standards and values are a lot less important. I think both sides still have a huge interest to at least continue with the negotiations, which in any case will last at least for another five, six or even ten years and then decide whether Turkey should become a full member or opt for another constellation.
ES:                   For now it seems that Turkey has the assurance of Rasmussen that NATO will intervene in case the ISIS continues proceeding and maybe will also enter the Turkish territory at a certain point. There are quite a few problems that we are supposed to follow because they have regional implications. Are we to understand that 52% does not mean a carte blanche for Erdogan as far as the people of Turkey are considered?
EG:                   No, because it is not the huge majority that Erdogan and the AKP expected. It’s important also to remember that voter turnout this time was extremely low for Turkey standards with only 74%. In the municipal elections, still 89% voted, there is the obligation by law to vote in Turkey. That’s why the turnout has always been since 1983 around 90%. This time the elections were in the major holiday season with many people not in the cities or villages where they are registered. With this low voter turnout this also means that Erdogan got also a lot less than 50%.
ES:                   Mr.Guzeldere, we thank you one more time for sharing your ideas about this historic election.
EG:                   I thank you as always.


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